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A COMPARISON OF TWO EVIDENTIAL REASONING SCHEMES
Sunny Lee
Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette. IN 47907
ABSTRACT
[1] advocate the use of Dempster-Shafer (0-5) theory in evidence-gathering process.
It is stated that they are unaware of any formal model which could allow inexact rea-
soning at whatever level of abstraction. [2] later shows how evidential reasoning can
be conducted in the same hypolhesis space using a Bayesian model. The purpose of
this note is to examine the difference of theses two schemes, and to point out certain
inconsistencies of this Bayesian model with the motives behind the use of D-S model.
1. INTRODUCTION
Providing a framework for evidential reasoning in an AI system has become an important
task. In a recent publication, "A Method of Managing Evidential Reasoning in a Hierarchical
Hypothesis Space" [1], Gordon and Shonliffe (G-S) advocate the use of the Dempster-Shafer
(D-S) theol}' in evidence-gathering process. They adapt the D-S theory to evidential reasoning in
a tree-structured hierarchy of hypotheses. It is stated Ihat they are unaware of any formal model
which could allow inexact reasoning at whatever level of abstraction. Pearl [2] later shows how
evidential reasoning can be conducted in Ihe same hypol.hesis space using a Bayesian model. The
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purpose of this note is to examine the difference of lhese two approaches, and to point out certain
inconsistencies of this Bayesian model with the motives behind the use of D-S model.
2. THE DOMAIN
Suppose an expert is diagnosing a case X. The diagnostic hypolhesis set
H = {h I ' ...• hn } are known to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Any subset of
hypothesis in H gives rise 10 a new hypothesis which is assumed to be of semantic interest The
diagram can be viewed as a n-Iayer graph. with H as the root on the top layer and the individual
hypotheses as the leaves in the nth layer and each intennediate nodes stands for the disjunction of
its immediate successors. For illustrative purposes. Figure 1 shows the graph corresponding
H = {h 10 h,. h,. h,}.
Although [lJ [2] both constrain the graph into a tree, it is clear later that this setting would
be more convenient for the purpose of comparison without the necessity of introducing additional
approximation step. In [2], the 3-srep evidence aggregation technique is apparently not restricted
to a tree-structured hierarchy of hypothesis. In [I], discussions of the Dempster-Shafer lheory are
in fact based on a layer graph instead of a tree. The purpose of restricting a graph into a tree is
for computational pwposes where G-S has to introduce approximation steps for the D-S theory to
overcome the combinational computation.
Several motives which have led G~S to advocate the use of the Dempster-Shafer theory are
listed below:
(i) Evidence partially in favor of a hypolhesis should not be construed as evidence par-
tially against the same hypothesis (Le. in favor of its negation).
(ii) Model allows an inexact reasoning at whatever level of abstraction is appropriate for
the evidence that has been gathered.
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(iii) Ability to distinguish between uncertainty I or lack of knowledge and equal certainty.
3. BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF BOTH SCHEMES
3.1 D-S Model
There are two functions in the D-S model: one is called bpa - basic probability assignment,
another is called belief function. A bpa. denoted m. assigns a number in [0,1] to every node in
the layer graph such that these numbers swn to 1. A belief function, denoted Bel, corresponding
to a specific bpa, m, assigns to every node of the layer graph the sum of m -values of every des-
cendant (including itself).
Example 1.
An expert may have a role knowledge:
Rl: Evidence e I, confirms hI to the degree 0.2
m(h,) = 0.2, m(H) = 0.8
Bel(A) = O.2ifh, E A .. H, Bel(H) = 1
R2: Evidence e2, disconfinns {h2. h3} to the degree 0.8
m({h" h,}') = m({h lo h,}) = 0.8, m(H) = 0.2
Bel (A) =0.8 if{h" h,} cA .. 0, Bel (H) = 1
These two examples allow one to address whatever level of abstraction which is appropriate
for the gathered evidence, and illustrate (ii) effectively. Examining RI, it says nothing about lhe
complement (or negation) of hI which is {h 2• h3• h4}. It is clear that m({h2• h3• hll}) = O. Bel
({h 2• h3• h 4}) = O. This captures (i) very well. Occasionally. it is hard to think why 0.2 in Rl
gives no hint on the negation of h I. The following argument will be useful: Suppose a textbook
says there are five pieces of evidence to characterize h I. However, the relationship of these five
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pieces of evidence with other h j i '#. 1 is complex and Dot clear. The expert who has read this
textbook may give the knowledge engineer a rule that if a piece of evidence observed then
confinns hI to the degree 0.2. Under this circumstance, he would be reluctant 10 tell the
knowledge engineer anything more of other associations.
3.2 A Baysian Model
Initially, each singleton hypothesis h j is assigned a probability in [O.ll, denoting p. such
"that L p(hj) = 1. These p(hj ) are suggested to reflect the probability that h j is true given all
;=1
previous evidence. The probability in each intennediate node is the sum afthe probability of its
constituents i.e. peA) = L p(h,).
~eA
The most important identity, a definition, introduced in [2J is
A, = pee IS)
pee IS')
where SC is the complement of S willi respect to H, e is a new piece of evidence. The expert is
required to estimate A.s where the hypothesis S is of his interest. A.s is the degree to which the
evidence confinns or disconfinns S. IfAs > 1 then it is called confinnation, while jf As < 1 it is
called a disconfirmation.
Example 2.
An expen may have a rule of knowledge as
R3: Evidence e 1 confinns hI to the degree 4
S={h,}; 1.,=4
R4: Evidence e2 disconfinns {h2• h 3} 10 the degree 0.25
S = {h 2• h,}; A, = 0.25
RS: Evidence e3 disconfinns hI to the degree 0.2
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The above examples can address whatever level of abstraction (Le. any hypothesis set, not
necessarily restricted to singleton hypothesis) which is appropriate for the gathered evidence, and
also illustrates (ii) well.
4. THE COMPARISON
From above, one can see that the proposed Bayesian model illustrates motive (ii) effectively
due [0 the introduction of I..s ' However we will point out that the framework is inconsistent with
other motives. Next we will examine the effect of combining two rules applying to a singleton
hypolhesis.
4.1 Motives Requirement
"Confirmation" or "disconfirmatioo" used in [1] [2] mean different things. In [I], the
usage has a logical semantics, while the usage in [2] is only for convenience. which might occa-
sionally be misleading. As an example, one may have the following rule:
R6: Evidence e 6 confirms that Dr. ShortlifJe is in his office to the degree 0.6.
Equivalently, one could say
Evidence e6, disconfirms that Dr. Shortliffe is not in his office to the degree 0.6.
When one perfonns compulation, statements involved "disconfinns" are always convened to
•'confirms" . In contrast to this, the rule in [2] may be written as:
R7: Evidence e 6 confums that Dr. Shortlijfe is in his office to the degree 4.
However one could not translate it into
R7': Evidence e 6. disconfirms that Dr. Short/if!e is not in his office to the degree 4.
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Because one could figure out the degree of belief that Dr. Shortliffe is not in his office based on
the degree that Dr. Shortliffe is in his office. Recall that
It is easy to see that
As ~ pte IS) .
p(eIS')
1,. • = pte IS') = pte IS')
S pte IS) pte IS')·
Therefore, a correct way would be
Evidence e6 disconfirms that Dr. Short/iffe is not in his office to the degree 0.25.
It is clear that "confirm" or "disconfirm" is used for convenience. One might as well use the
term below
Based on evidence e6. the degree oflhe belief that Dr. Short/iffe is in his office is 4.
It is apparent that evidence in favor of h is used to partially support the negation of h as opposed
to what author [2] claims - that it would not be construed for other purposes. Although [2]
claims that the expert is not required to apply any conscious effort whatsoever regarding other
propositions in the system, the formula about A.s is actually used in the computational process to
derive the updating scheme. If A.s were not equal to the inverse of As. then there will be incon-
sistency in the framework.
As for the motive (iii), this is one of the properties that a Bayesian model generally does not
have. For instance, the situation that a piece of evidence provides equal certainty on S and SC I i.e
As = 1 will be treated as if no evidence (or lack of evidence) at all in view of the updating
scheme.
4.2 The Effect of Combining Two Rules
It is now for us to write down the belief updating scheme [2] as follows:
p(hjlel ... e,J=a(SI ... SII)Wj(el •... , e/l)p(hj )






I - I, if
and a1..S I ... Sf!) is a normalizing factor.
The formula could be understood by examining one piece of evidence e I. which bears
directly on S I and the degree afbelicf is A.t_ To update the probability, first one must multiply A.l
to probability of every hypothesis in S 1 and keep the probabilities of other hypothesis the same.
Next. one has to nonnalize the sum of the probabilities to 1. The fonnula also says that one could
delay the normalization.
We now discuss the effect of combining two rules. One notes that there is no need to obtain
any apriori belief in each singleton hypothesis in D-S model as required in Baysian Model. As
said in [1], there are three categories when rules are applying to singleton hypothesis.
(1) they may boLh confirm or both disconfirm the same hypothesis,
(2) one may confirm and the other may disconfirrn the same hypothesis,
(3) each may bring evidence to bear on different competing hypothesis.
Note that Tl,1'2 below stand for rules in D-S model while KI, K2 stand for rules in this Bayesian
model
Category 1
Tl: confinns h 1 to the degree 81
1'2: confinns h 1 to the degree 82
Kl: belief in h 1to the degree Al
Kl: belief in h1 to the degree Az
For D-S model, the combined effect is that one can replace Tl, 1'2 by a rule "confinns h I to
the degree 8 I + 82 - 81 82"· One observes that 81 + 82 - 8 I 822: max(8t 8i), therefore it always
increases the belief in h 1.
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For Baysian Model, through simple computation, the combined effect is that Kl, K2 can be
replaced by a rule •'belief in hI to the degree AI 'Jvz". In this category, Alo 'Jvz are both necessarily
greater than 1, therefore the confirmation in h I is also strengthened as that in D-S model. How-
ever, the belief in other singleton hypothesis is necessarily reduced.
Category 2
Tl: confirms hi to the degree s 1
1'2: disconfums hI to the degree S2
Kl: confirms h I to the degree A.I
K2: disconfinns h I to the degree 'Jvz
For Baysian Model, Kl and K2 can be replaced by "belief in hI to the degree Al A.z" as the
same in Category 1. It is evident that the strength of belief in h I depends on the magnitude of A.i
Az· It confinns hI and reduces the support for {hz h3 h4} when 1..1 ~ > 1. It disconfinns h I and
increases the support for {hz h 3 h 4} when AI A.z < 1. If A.l A.z = 1 then nothing changes as if
there were no evidence at all. It is noted that this behaves like CF model used in MYCIN system.
To compute the net effect based on TI and 1'2, one has to convert 1'2 to TIl - confinns
h z•h 3• h 4 to the degree Sz_ No single rule in this format can replace TI, 1'2. However, the result
is that the supports in hI and {h z•h3• h4} provided by each are both reduced after combination
(see [1]).
Category 3
Tl: confirms hI to the degree SI
1'2: disconfirrns h z to the degreesz
Kl: confirms h I to the degree /...1
Kl: disconfirms hz to the degree Az
For D-S model, the belief in hi entails the belief in {h I, h 3, h 4} which in tum strengthens
1'2. However, the belief in {h h h3, h4} does not say anything about individual elements which
therefore does not affect the confirmation in h 1.
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For Baysian Model, the updates is as follows:
p(hde) = a A,p(h l )
p(h,le) = a 'A.,p(hi)
p(h,le) ~ a p(h,)
p(h,le)=a p(h,)
where a = IA,p (h ,) + 'A.,p (hi) + 1 - P (h 1 U hi)rl
One sees that
a'!.., ~ A,p(h,) + 'A.,p(hi) + 1-p(h, u hi)
> -"""7-'---;;-"""7::''1..0..'-:----'0---:--:-" (since A" < I)
A,p(h,) + A,p~i) + 1-p(h, u hi)
=
A,p(h, u hi) + I-p(h, u hi)
> 1 (since A, > I)
and
aA" = A,p(h l ) + 'A.,p(hi) + 1 - p(h, u hi)
< A"
'A.,p (h I) + 'A.,p (hi) + 1 - P (h 1 u hi)
A"
~ "'A.,p-(""h-,-U-'h:-i)'-+=I---P-(""h-,-u-'h:-:-i)
< 1 (since A" < I)
Now, a could he any value depending on '1.." A", p(h l ) p(hi).
result as below.
Thus. one can summarize the
Continuation in h 1 and disconfirmaLion in hz still holds. However, the degree of .,confirm
and disconfinn" may get strengthened or weakened. The effect on other hypothesis may get
increased or decreased.
5. CONCLUSION
With regard to computational aspect, this Bayesian model [2J has obviously provided asim-
pIe and convenient framework:. However. it is inconsistent wiLh some of the motives which have
led G-S to advocate the use of D-S model. It is evident that each technique could find its proper
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